Mathematical Theory of Evidence (MTE) is blamed to leave frequencies outside its framework. In this paper we consider this problem from the point of view of conditioning in the MTE. We describe the class of belief functions for which marginal consistency with observed frequencies may be achieved and conditional belief functions are proper belief functions,and deal with implications for approximation of general belief functions by this class and for inference models in MTE.
INTRODUCTION
The Dempster-Shafer Theory or the Mathematical Theory of Evidence (MTE) [21, 3] is intended to be a generalization of bayesian theory of subjective probability [24] . This theory offers capability of representing ignorance in a simple and direct way, compatibility with the classical probability theory, compatibility with boolean logic and feasible computational complexity [20] . MTE may be applied for (1) representation of incomplete knowledge, (2) belief updating, (3) and for combination of evidence [18] .MTE covers the statistics of random sets and may be applied for representation of incomplete statistical knowledge. Random set statistics is quite popular in analysis of opinion polls whenever partial indecisiveness of respondents is allowed [4] . Practical applications of MTE include: integration of knowledge from heterogeneous sources for object identification [2] , technical diagnosis under unreliable measuring devices [5] , medical applications: [7, 31] .
In spite of indicated merits, MTE experienced sharp criticism from many sides. The basic line of criticism is connected with the relationship between the belief function (the basic concept of MTE) and frequencies [30, 8] . A number of attempts to interpret belief functions in terms of probabilities have failed so far to produce a fully compatible interpretation with MTE -see e.g. [14, 8, 6 ] etc. Shafer [24] and Smets [27] , in defense of MTE, dismissed every attempt to interpret MTE frequentistically. Shafer stressed that even modern (that meant bayesian) statistics is not frequentistic at all (bayesian theory assigns subjective probabilities), hence frequencies be no matter at all. Wasserman [30] strongly opposed claims of Shafer [24] about frequencies and bayesian theory. Wasserman pointed out that the major success story of bayesian theory is the exchangeability theory of de Finetti, which treats frequency based probabilities as a special case of bayesian belief. Hence frequencies, as Wasserman claims, are inside the bayesian theory, but outside the Mathematical Theory of Evidence.
In this paper we consider this problem from the point of view of apriorical and aposteriorical conditioning in the MTE. We describe the class of belief functions for which: marginal consistency with observed frequencies may be achieved, apriorical conditional belief functions are proper belief functions We will assume that the Reader is familiar with basic concepts of MTE like: belief function (Bel), basic probability assignment function (bpa, or m), commonality function(Q), marginalization (projection) onto a subset s of the set of all variables (Bel ↓s ), vacuous extension onto the set of variables (Bel ↑s ), focal points (sets for which bpa is non-zero). These terms are explained in many standard papers and books on MTE [21, 25] .
CASE-BASED UNDERSTANDING OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS
In an attempt to overcome the reason for those numerous failures to interpret consistently Dempster's rule of combination, a new frequency interpretation of MTE has been proposed in [13] . It has been demonstrated there that, in general, Dempster's rule has a destructive impact on the data so that whatever we expect calculation of conditional probabilities (given an event) differs from whatever we obtain under conditioning (given an event) in MTE (see the definition of aposteriorical conditioning of Shafer in [22] .
Let us have a look at SQL construct to calculate joint probability distribution from a database in two variables P(X,Y):
create view Total (Counted) as select count(*) from Cases;
create view Probability (X,Y,Prob) as select X,Y, count(*)/Counted from Cases,Total group by X,Y;
Let us look at calculation of conditional probability P (X, Y |X ∈ A X ). We proceed as follows: we select first the proper subset of cases from the database and proceed to calculate the unconditional probability for the selected cases. If we calculate a conditional probability P (X, Y |X ∈ A X , X ∈ B X ) on a series of conditions (X ∈ A X , X ∈ B X ) we can proceed first by selecting cases for the first, then for the second condition etc., finding the intersection, and then calculating the probabilities (id -the identifier). If we calculate a conditional bpa m(||X ∈ A X , X ∈ B X ) on a series of conditions (X ∈ A X , X ∈ B X ) we CANNOT proceed by selecting cases for the first, then for the second condition etc., finding the intersection, and then calculating the bpa, because this would yield wrong results due to side effects stemming from case modifications.
This has a serious impact if we try to factorize a belief function into simpler components, e.g. for purposes of propagation of uncertainty (methods of propagation of uncertainty are presented e.g. in [1, 25] . It turns out that:
• It is, in general, impossible to factorize a joint belief distribution into components being conditional belief functions 1 (see eg. • What is more, it is often impossible to factorize a belief function Bel in variables p, q, r into two factors one Bel 1 in variables p, r and the second Bel 2 in variables q, r even if in conditional distribution given any value of the variable r, variables p, q are independent (see [29] , that is when for every subset r i of the domain of the variable r the following holds:
Therefore in papers [9, 10, 13] we have presented another approach to factorization of belief functions in terms of anticonditional belief functions. It turns out, however, that anticonditional belief functions are in general not belief functions but only pseudo-belief functions (that is ones with non-negative commonality functions). Thus, anticonditional belief functions have no direct counterparts in the physical world, as the basic probability assignment may take negative values.
One can be tempted to suggest, that one shall then resign from modeling the joint belief distribution and instead try to find a marginally consistent decomposition of the joint belief distribution. But:
• What is the class of Dempster-Shafer (DS) belief functions for which apriori-conditional belief functions exist ?
• How can general belief functions and uncertainty propagation for them be approximated by this class of belief functions and uncertainty propagation for them ?
• How can the belief functions and the reasoning with them be related to frequencies (cases)?
2 In probability distributions, a-priori and a-posteriori conditionals from the point of view of frequencies coincide, and they always exist: Let us assume P(X,Y) is a frequency based (case-based) probability distribution of X,Y. A posteriori conditional distribution of variable X given variable Y=y is interpreted as uncertainty distribution of variable X P ′ (X|Y = y) if we restrict ourselves only to cases for which Y=y. Apriori conditional distribution of X given Y is a function P (X|Y ) in X,Y defined as P (X|Y ) = P (X ∩Y )/P (Y ) for all values of y for which P (Y = y) > 0. Obviously:
CORRECT APPROXIMATION OF CONDITIONALS
Shafer [22] 
What shall be the focal points of the multivariate belief function Bel X,Z in two variables X,Z ? Marginal consistency will be achieved either if we assume
and if we take
and if we suppose
and for many other belief functions. But which one is the best ? Let us try to calculate the conditional belief function
↓Z with Bel X=xi being a belief function with the only focal point m X=xi ({(x 1 , z 1 ), (x 1 , z 2 )}) = 1). We get three totally different results -three belief functions with differing focal points:
It is next to impossible to decide which of these conditionals is the correct one from the point of view of the observed data. So which belief function shall be treated as the most representative for the data ? We suggest here the first one (Bel 1 ) for the following reasons:
1. if we observe X, Z separately, we have no reason to assume that x 1 must co-occur with z 1 but never with z 2 etc -we assume we have no more information than actually visible from the data, 2. the methods of uncertainty propagation suggested both by Cano et al. [1] and Shenoy & Shafer [25] implicitly assume that the joint belief in values of observed variables X 1 , X 2 , ...X n is the composition of the values of individual variables: 
Let us consider calculation of an apriori conditional belief function in the sense of Cano et al. [1] such that it would imply the value of Z given X,Y. A look at the data would suggest that variables X,Y and Z are connected by the logical equation: X ∧ Y = Z so that one might suggest a belief function with focal point
is the apriori conditional connecting X,Y and Z. But this is a wrong conclusion, because:
Bel and = Bel Hence it is nearly obvious that in general case-based (separately measured) belief functions do not possess marginally consistent conditional belief functions.
Therefore it is in general of primary interest to find an appropriate approximation of general belief functions by means of decompositions into Cano's et al apriori-conditionals. Let us say that an approximation Bel ′ of belief function Bel is correct iff for every set A Bel ′ (A) < Bel(A). An approximation Bel ′ of belief function Bel is marginally correct iff for every variable X and every set A Bel ′ ↓X (A)) < Bel ↓X (A).
Let us consider the following algorithm for calculation of a correct approximation of the function Bel in variables X,Y: 0. We initialize the basic probability assignment function m cond defined over variables X,Y with 0 for every subset of Ξ X × Ξ Y .
For each set
2. i:=1, q:=0
4. For the relation r i we select a function a i :
5. We update the function m cond as follows: We calculate the set
6. We update the g function as follows: For each set
8. i:=i+1. If g is equal zero everywhere then terminate, otherwise continue with step 3.
The marginal quality of an approximation constructed by the above algorithm be the quantity q. The quality q can range from zero to one. If the quality is equal one then we have constructed a marginally consistent conditional of Bel given X. If Bel is a probabilistic belief function (with focal points being singleton sets), then a marginally consistent Cano's conditional of Bel given X always exists. If Bel is a general belief function possessing a marginally consistent Cano's conditional of Bel given X, then the construction by the above algorithm of the conditional is characterized by the fact that in step 4 we have r i (A X ) = ξX ∈AX a i (ξ X ). However, the construction task as such is hard. In particular, we cannot assume that if there exists a Cano's conditional of Bel given X, and if and if for i=1,...,k we managed to obtain r i (A X ) = ξX ∈AX a i (ξ X ), then we will get a r i (A X ) = ξX ∈AX a i (ξ X ) for i=k+1. Consider the following (counter)example: Let Bel be a belief function separately measurable in X,Y, marginally consistent with Bel 1 ⊕ Bel 2 where Bel 1 being a belief function in X, Bel 2 in X,Y with focal points:
Obviously then Bel 2 is the marginally consistent Cano conditional of Bel. Let us select r 1 as follows:
We can then easily construct function a 1 as a 1 (x 1 ) = y 1 , a 1 (x 2 ) = y 1 , a 1 (x 3 ) = y 1 so that obviously r 1 (A X ) = ξX ∈AX a 1 (ξ X ). However, if we increase in step 8 i to i=2 and reenter step 3, then it will not be possible any more to construct such an a 2 that r 2 (A X ) = ξX ∈AX a 2 (ξ X ) because necessarily a fragment of r 2 will be:
Hence in general finding a marginally consistent Cano's conditional, even if it exists, is hard and requires backtracking. So probably one will be satisfied already if one finds a high quality marginally correct approximate conditional belief distribution (Application of genetic algorithms is advised here.).
IMPACT ON REASONING
Let Bel be a belief function in X,Y and Bel |X its marginally correct approximate conditional belief distribution. Then Bel ↓X ⊕ Bel |X is a marginally correct approximation of Bel. Then Shafer's conditioning Bel(||A X × Ξ Y ) with A X being any non-empty subset of the domain Ξ X of X is marginally correctly approximated by (Bel
given the "decomposition" of Bel into its marginal on X and the approximately correct conditional on X we can reason approximately correctly about the a posteriori distribution of Y given any event of observation of the intrinsic value of X. However, we cannot do it in the reverse direction: we cannot derive the aposterioric distribution of X by observation of Y because in general Bel(||Ξ X × A Y ) with A Y being any non-empty subset of the domain Ξ Y of Y is NOT marginally correctly approximated by (Bel ↓X ⊕ Bel |X )(||Ξ X × A Y ). What is worse, even if the conditionals are marginally consistent, we will not achieve marginal correctnesses, not to say marginal consistency.
Thus, if we have a marginally consistent factorization of a belief function then we can in general use neither Shafer & Shenoy nor Cano's at al. framework for propagation of uncertainty because the results will be inconsistent with the data. A way out of this problem, for the framework of Cano, is to consider separate marginally correct approximations in each direction of reasoning. Given the polytree representing correctly dependencies among variables, we need to transform this polytree, for every variable the value of which we want to infer, into a such a (belief) network graph that every arrow points towards that variable. In case of plain directed trees the result of this transformation is a polytree (with undirected backbone identical with that of the original tree) such that edges connecting the target variable with its neighbous are reoriented to point at the target variable and every other variable is connected via a directed path with the target variable. In case of general polytree the result of the transformation is a network with more edges than the original polytree. Edges are added when an edge is reversed which originally pointed at a node with many ingoing edges. E.g. if we had the situation that X− > Z < −Y and we want to invert the edge Z < −Y , then we need to add the edge X− > Y . In case of general polytree we obtain in this way networks with considerably different undirected backbones 3 .
If we assume that we adopt a structure (factorization) of Cano type, that is in form of a generalized polytree (singly connected "bayesian" network), then products of above transformations are directly convertible into a Shenoy's and Shafer's Markov tree. Let us now shift to Shenoy's and Shafer's belief propagation in Markov tree: The general principle there is "message passing" -if a node of Markov-tree gets information from its all but one neighbors , then it sends, to the remaining node, a "message", that is ⊕ combination of those messages plus its own factor of the belief function factorization. In the original Shenoy/Shafer algorithm, this node's own factor of the belief function factorization is exactly the same independly to which neighbor the message is sent. We propose to have separate hypertrees for each target variable and to reason within each of them in one direction only (resp. modifications of propagation algorithm are known). Then it is guaranteed that the results of reasoning (a posteriori marginal distributions) will be marginally correct approximations with respect to the intrinsic distribution.
Cano et al. conditionals are in fact sets of mappings between sets of variables selected with some probability. This gives a new meaning to the belief function. Instead of thinking in the way probability functions do that is that given some value of one variable, the conditional probability distribution assigns a value to another variable, we can think of objects that are assigned with some probability a belief.
DISCUSSION
Smets [27] [6] ), random sets (Nguyen [15] ), probabilities of provability (Pearl [16] ), probabilities of necessity (Ruspini [19] ) etc. But these authors usually do not explain or justify the dynamic component (how are beliefs updated?), that is, how updating (conditioning) is to be handled (except in some cases by defining conditioning as a special case of combination). So I (that is Smets) feel that these partial comparisons are incomplete, especially as all these interpretations lead to different updating rules." ( [27] , pp. 324-325). Ironically, Smets gives later in the same paper an example of belief function ("hostile-Mother-Nature-Example") which may be clearly considered as lower probability interpretation of belief function, just, at further consideration, leading to very same pitfalls as approaches criticized himself.
In order to explicate the reasons of failures of various attempts to establish a case-based interpretation of MTE, in this paper we drew our attention to the questions related to updating (conditioning) in this theory. We have investigated some fundamental problems of case-based interpretation of the Dempster-Shafer Mathematical Theory of Evidence.
• The problem of the meaning of a case for MTE. It has been argued that if some observed attributes are set-valued then the meaning of the case should be the cross-product of all these sets (and not any subset, e.g. a marginally consistent subset of this cross product).
• The problem of meaning of aposteriori distribution given observation of some variables (Smets; "updating" problem). It has been argued that, for calculation of empirical (case-based) MTE aposteriori belief distributions, the interesting cases need not only to be selected but also updated
• The problem of apriori-conditioning: it has been argued that in general apriori conditionals of (case-based) belief functions are not belief functions, but rather pseudo-belief functions (with negative basic "probability" assigments), hence lacking a case-baaed interpretation. What is more, even every belief function marginally consistent with a given case-based belief distribution may lack apriori conditional belief function. In the rare cases when a marginally consistent belief function has an apriori conditional belief function, there exits always Cano's conditional belief function for that belief function.
• The problem of marginally correct approximation of a belief function. It has been argued that even if a marginally consistent Cano's conditional belief function for a belief function exists, it is hard to find. Therefore one needs to look for algorithms constructing marginally correct approximated apriori conditional belief functions. A general frame algorithm has been given together with a proposed function of quality evaluation of the approximation.
• The problem of reasoning with marginally correct approximations via conditional marginally correct approximated apriori belief functions. It has been argued that, if we want to achieve results corresponding properly to empirical (case-based) belief functions, it is necessary to abandon the traditional form of uncertainty propagation proposed by Cano et al and by Shenoy and Shafer. Instead of Markov fields, which are insensitive to the orientation of reasoning, one shall use unidirectional mode of reasoning. 3. Hence in case of direct dependence of a set of n variables, n inferences networks -one for each variable as dependent on the remaining oneshave to be established and used depending on target variable.
CONCLUSION

